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Abstract
We study one-sided oﬀers bargaining game g where players cannot com-
mit Þnalizing the trade. The game never ends but implements terms of
trade iﬀ there is stage k from which on players agree on these terms. Other-
wise, no-trade results. We show that equilibria induced by g are equivalent
to equilibrium bounded bargaining schemes that are robust against bound
extensions.
Game g has many sequential equilibria. We give the seller a leading role
in equilibrium selection. The seller is allowed to swift from one equilibrium
to another iﬀ this is dynamically consistent. We show that the set of
admissible equilibria, or stable set, is unique. Under typical conditions,
equilibrium in a stable set allocates the good to the buyer with price equal
to the buyers least valuation in the belief closed set of valuations. Thus
higher order uncertainty does not counterbalance the situation in favor of
the seller.
Keywords: No commitment, higher order beliefs, Coasian bargaining.
JEL: C72, D44, D78.
1 Introduction
Bargaining is about commitment. The aim of this paper is to study one-sided
oﬀers bargaining under the logical benchmark assumption that players do not
have any commitment power. To achieve this goal, a new approach is developed.
General beliefs are allowed.1
By the Coase conjecture,2 if a seller of a good is unable to commit to her
price oﬀers in a one-sided oﬀers bargaining situation, then trade takes place
∗Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation, Ludviginkatu 3-5, FIN-00130 Helsinki. E-mail:
hannu.vartiainen@yjs.Þ.
I thank Klaus Kultti, Hannu Salonen and Juuso Välimäki for useful comments.
1Weakening the informational assumptions is an apt research topic in bargaining and game
theory. Recent examples include Yildiz (2002) and Bergemann-Morris (2003).
2The conjecture is established by Coase (1972) in the context of durable good monopolist.
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without delay with the price equal to the least possible reservation valuation of
the buyer. Gul et.el. (1986) and Fudenberg et.el. (1986) conÞrm this conjec-
ture when sellers beliefs of the buyers valuations are common knowledge, and
buyers least possible valuation is bounded away from sellers valuation.3 The
result is sensitive to the informational assumptions. Feinberg and Skrzypacz
(2002) show that with one additional level of uncertainty an equilibrium may
emerge, where the seller achieves surplus above the least possible valuation of
the buyer, and delays occur.
In the standard model4 one is typically interested in the limit case where
the cost of waiting goes to zero. However, even in the limit, the model relies on
a commitment assumption: Once the buyer accepts sellers oﬀer, trade takes
place and payoﬀs materialize. Thus the seller can commit not to change her oﬀer
once the oﬀer is accepted. This paper argues that without external commitment
devices, it is diﬃcult for the seller to take advantage of her private information.5
A problem with no-commitment is that any game that ends up implementing
an outcome at some Þnite terminal history contains some commitment power
- an implemented outcome cannot be non-implemented even if wanted by the
players. How should one model bargaining without any commitment? Muthoo
(1990, 1994) studies bargaining games when the players cannot commit not to
retract their oﬀers. However, in his model they can commit to implement trade
when they do not retract an accepted oﬀer. Our aim is to analyse a games
without any commitment.
A standard position in noncooperative game theory is that any feature of
a social situation that aﬀects players behavior should be clearly spelled out
through the extensive game form6 that represents the situation (see Rubinstein,
1991). Ideally, if an extensive form reßects no-commitment, then it should allow
players to change their past actions if they wish to. Formally this desideratum
can be met by game forms that are structurally stationary in a sense that
players moves do not have any inßuence on the continuation extensive form.
If this is true, then past actions are never physically restrictive. Note that the
standard model does not meet the desideratum since after buyers acceptance
the continuation game is diﬀerent from the continuation game after rejection.
The Þrst contribution of the paper is to come up with an extensive game
form that meets the desideratum. We analyse the following sequential moves
game form g: At each odd stage, the seller makes an oﬀer and at each even stage
3More precisely, this is true in the Gap case and only in the limit. Once a delay between
consecutive oﬀers becomes small, the price of the good approaches buyers lowest possible
valuation. In the No Gap case a stationarity restrictions is needed to obtain the same result
(see Ausubel and Deneckere 1989a,b).
4 In the standard model, the seller makes oﬀers which are either rejected or accepted by
the buyer. If an oﬀer is rejected, the seller makes a new oﬀer. If an oﬀer is accepted, it is
implemented. The buyer knows his reservation valuation whereas the seller does not. Sellers
valuation is common knowledge.
5Feinberg-Skrzypacz (2002) use inÞnitely mixed strategies in their equilibria whereas we
only allow Þnitely mixed strategies. See the end of Section 5 for discussion on this.
6A game form speciÞes the order of moves and the physical consequences of all possible
combinations of the moves. Together with preferences and information structure, the game
form constitutes a game. See e.g. Osborne-Rubinstein (1995).
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the buyer either accepts or rejects. The game never ends. If there is a stage from
which onwards the seller always makes oﬀer m, for some m ∈ R, and the buyer
always accepts, then payoﬀs equal to trade with transfer m become associated
to the players (at the inÞnity). Otherwise, zero payoﬀs become associated to
the players.
Although payoﬀs do not ever materialize with g in Þnite time, the order of
moves is well deÞned and each (inÞnite) strategy vector is associated with a
physical outcome. Thus, together with belief structure p, pair (g, p) constitutes
a proper extensive form game. As players strategic options in the continuation
game are independent of their past actions, also the desideratum above is met.
Extensive form g does not reßect any commitment power on the part of the
players.
We allow all beliefs over a Þnite set of possible signals. Our Þrst obser-
vation is that whenever players pure or Þnitely mixed strategies are common
knowledge, there exists a stage from which onwards it is common knowledge
which outcome is to be implemented. Thus, in equilibrium where strategies
are common knowledge the game unavoidably reveals the outcome that will
be implemented. Hence, if information regarding the implemented outcome is
disperse at the beginning of the game, then there has to be a player who reveals
the eventual outcome. Much of the consecutive analysis of this paper is about
showing that such player typically does not exist.
Game (g, p) hosts many pure strategy (or Þnitely mixed) sequential equilib-
ria. The second contribution of the paper is to develop an equilibrium selection
argument that is motivated by the idea that the seller plays a leading role in
choosing the equilibrium.7 Equilibrium selection takes place as a function of
beliefs. The central feature of the equilibrium selection rule is dynamic consis-
tency. Namely, in consent with the no-commitment assumption, we assume that
the seller cannot commit not to switch to a new more proÞtable equilibrium
whenever such becomes feasible. Of course, in any admissable equilibrium this
should not be the case. Hence we need to answer which equilibrium selection
rules are admissible, i.e. dynamically consistent.
Admissible equilibria are characterized in the language of vonNeumann-
Morgenstern stable sets. First we establish a dominance relation - which we
call upsetting - on the set of equilibria. Roughly, an equilibrium is upset by
another if it is common knowledge that the seller strictly prefers the latter at
some positive probability information node of the former equilibrium, given
the posterior beliefs induced at this node. If the seller is empowered to move
from one equilibrium to another, then an upset equilibrium should be deemed
unstable. The problem is that there typically does not exist any non-upset equi-
librium. However, dynamic consistency does not require admissible equilibria
to be non-upset but only stable in the following sense. Any stable equilibrium
cannot be upset by another stable equilibrium (internal stability), and any un-
stable equilibrium must be upset by a stable one (external stability).8 The set
7This is in line with the standard mechanism design approach that allows the designer to
choose her most desired equilibrium of the mechanism.
8Since upsetting is deÞned with respect to the beliefs, a stable equilibrium selection rule
has much Markovian ßavor.
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of stable equilibria that meets the two stability criteria, or a stable set, is the
object of our study.
vNM stable set has not gone without recognition in the noncooperative
game theory. Two immediately related papers are Blume and Sobel (1997) and
Vartiainen (2001).9 The Þrst one introduces reÞnement of a cheap talk game
that uses stable set as the solution device. Their aim is to remove equilibria
that are not robust against the sender wanting to continue communication.
The motivation of their dominance relation and upsetting are similar, even if
they diﬀer formally. The second paper uses upsetting based stable set to reÞne
equilibria in an auction design game where the seller is unable to commit not to
change the rules of the designed auction. All these papers are based on the idea
that stable set reßects sequential rationality, given the behavior induced by the
dominance relation at hand. A general taxonomy of consistency approaches,
relating them back to stable set, is oﬀered by Greenberg (1990).
First we apply the solution to the binary reservation valuations case, which
is special and transparent. Assume that buyers valuations are derived from the
set {θ0, θ1} such that 0 < θ0 < θ1. Information of a player is represented by a
private signal. Signal of the buyer determines his valuation in the set {θ0, θ1}.
Players signals can be correlated in arbitrary way.
We construct a set of equilibria G∗ where each equilibrium sells the good
to the buyer with price equal to his least possible valuation in the belief closed
set of valuations.10 A belief closed set can be larger than the support of sellers
belief over buyers reservation valuations, and hence the lowest valuation lower
than the one in the support of sellers beliefs (of buyers valuations). Our main
Þnding here is that the constructed set of equilibria is a stable set, and that the
stable set is unique up to payoﬀ irrelevant moves. Thus, the seller is forced to
sell the good with a low price if there is k such that (1) the buyer knows that
the buyer is willing to pay high price, (2) the buyer knows (1), (3) the seller
knows (2),..., (k) player i does not know (k-1).
For example, under the informational assumptions of Feinberg-Scrzypacz,
the seller is always forced to sell the good with price equal to the low valuation.
Thus in our framework the seller cannot take advantage his private information.
In the more general case buyers valuations are derived from a Þnite set
{θ0, ..., θK} such that 0 < θ0 < θ1 < · · · < θK . Also there we establish that
a stable set exists, and it is unique up to payoﬀ irrelevant moves. The general
structure of the stable set is diﬃcult to describe. In particular, G∗ fails to
be stable. However, in cases where information structure is suﬃciently well
behaved, monotonic, we can say more. Consider the following case, familiar
from the Global Games literature. Assume the seller obtains a noisy signal θk˜,
where k = k+ε, and ε is a noise term with support {0, 1} for k = 0, ..., of buyers
valuation. If k is not commonly known, i.e. not observable by the buyer, then
the buyer knows the signal of the buyer is at least θk−1. However, θk−1 and θk˜
do not coincide and therefore players cannot ever agree that sellers reservation
9Others include Asheim (1992), Asheim-Nilssen (1996), and Kahn-Mookherjee (1995).
10A belief closed set of types satisÞes the property that it is common knowledge that all
players types belong to this set.
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valuation is above θ0. This is the least possible valuation in the belief closed set
of valuations of the seller. In any stable equilibrium the seller is always forced
to sell the good to the buyer with price θ0.11
Extensive form games with general beliefs are typically diﬃcult to analyze.
Due to leeway provided by the disequilibrium beliefs, the set of equilibria easily
becomes unmanageable. Hence, reÞning equilibria through restrictions on dise-
quilibrium beliefs has become a huge research project. However, even if theories
abound, no commonly agreed principle how to restrict disequilibrium beliefs ex-
ists.12 An attractive feature of our equilibrium selection criterion - that also
drives the uniqueness results - is that it does not rely on to any restrictions
on disequilibrium beliefs (except by the assumption that they are common).
Stable set imposes conditions only on the on-the-equilibrium occurrences.
Admittedly, the assumption that an outcome is never implemented is cum-
bersome, and needs to be scrutinized. The third and most interesting contribu-
tion of the paper is to associate equilibria of game form g to concrete bargaining
schemes that always implement trade in Þnite time. We use the following pro-
cedure to generate such scheme. Take any strategy σ on g, and choose an initial
bound K (an even integer). 1: Given prior p, on the play path of (σ, p) imple-
ment outcome after stage K based on the most recent oﬀer by the seller and
rejection/acceptance of the buyer. 2: After any zero-probability move, identify
(any) new p0 and K 0, and repeat Step 1 with respect to them. By repeatedly ap-
plying Steps 1 and 2 one comes up with an extensive game form and a strategy
that is a truncated version of σ. If the induced strategy constitutes a sequential
equilibrium of the induced game, then the equilibrium play automatically ends
in Þnite time. Such scheme, a combination of a strategy and game, is called as
equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme.13
A virtue of the concept of equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme is that
it allows us to analyze the eﬀects of removing physical commitment devices.
Namely, if the equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme is not dependent on
the commitment aid provided by the bargaining bound, then the equilibrium
should survive any extension of it. Equilibrium bounded bargaining schemes
that meet such property are said to be robust against bound extensions (or
simply robust equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme). We show that the set
of equilibrium outcome functions induced by g and outcome functions induced
by robust equilibrium bounded bargaining schemes are equivalent. Any element
of the former corresponds with some element of the latter and vice versa. Thus,
g can be can be thought of as a device that only admits equilibrium outcome
functions that do not reßect any commitment power.
Finally, we focus on equilibrium strategies rather than outcome functions
11 If k˜ is commonly known, then the Coase conjecture follows: in any stable equilibrium the
seller is sells with price θk˜, which is the least reservation value that players commonly agree
is possible.
12 In fact, many signaling theories are subject to the criticism that the assumption they made
cannot be consistent with them being common knowledge among players. For discussion on
this so called Stiglitz-critique, see e.g. Mailath et.al (1993).
13The concept is heavily motivated by Ray and Vohra (1997), who analyse equilibrium
binding coalitional agreements.
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induced by them. We show that if one starts from robust equilibrium bounded
bargaining schemes, and derives equilibriaAR of g that correspond these schemes,
then the stable set G∗ belongs to AR. This implies that G∗ is the unique stable
set on AR as well. Hence, in terms of the stable set, nothing is added by focus-
ing on the grand set of equilibria of g rather than robust equilibrium bounded
bargaining schemes. E.g. in the binary valuations case, any robust equilibrium
bounded bargaining scheme allocates the good to the buyer with price θ0 unless
it is common knowledge that the buyer has higher valuation.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 deÞnes the informational condi-
tions, establishes the game form, and develops the solution concept. Section 3
deals with the binary valuations case, and Section 4 the many-valuations case.
Section 5 introduces the concept of equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme,
and establishes the equivalence result. The Þnal section closes the paper with
dscussion.
2 Framework
2.1 Information
There is a seller and a buyer bargaining over an indivisible object. Normalize
sellers reservation value, which is not subject to uncertainty, to 0. The buyer
privately knows his strictly positive reservation valuation θ onΘ. Let T = Ts×Tb
be a Þnite set of types. Let function θ : Tb → Θ describe how buyers reservation
valuation is associated to his type. Given set D of types t, denote the least
possible sellers reservation valuation by θ(D) = min{θ(tb) : (tb, ts) ∈ D}.
Denote by ∆ the of all probability distributions on T, representing players
beliefs in all states. Each tis beliefs are then represented by a conditional dis-
tribution p(· : ti) on T−i. Given p ∈ ∆, a belief closed subset BC = BCs×BCb
of T satisÞes the property that whenever t ∈ BC, then both players know their
types are in BC, they know that they know their types are in BC, and so forth.
Thus BC can be brought to players knowledge without aﬀecting their beliefs.
A belief closed subset is smallest if it holds true that the only belief closed
subset it contains is the set itself.
More formally, let Bs and Bb be the knowledge operators on T identifying
the largest event that ts and tb associate positive probability under (common)
p:14
Bb(p, ts) = S(p(· : ts)),
Bs(p, tb) = S(p(· : tb)).
Similarly, Bi(p,D−i) = ∪t−i∈D−iBi(p, t−i), for i = s, b. Construct inductively
B0s (p, t)×B0b (p, t) = Bs(p, tb)×Bb(p, ts), and
Bns (p, t)×Bnb (p, t) = Bs(p,Bn−1b (p, t))×Bb(p,Bn−1s (p, t)) for n = 1, ... .
Note that [Bns (p, t)×Bnb (p, t)] ⊆ [Bn+1s (p, t)×Bn+1b (p, t)] ⊆ T. Since T is Þnite
B∞s (p, t)×B∞b (p, t) well deÞned. Denote by BC(p, t) the smallest belief closed
14Support of p is a smallest closed set Y such that p(Y ) = 1.
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set that contains t, given p. Then
BC(p, t) = B∞s (p, t)×B∞b (p, t).
Note that D = BC(p, t) for t ∈ D = Ds×Db if and only if Bi(p,B−i(p,Di))) =
Di for all i = s, b.On the other hand, Bi(p,B−i(p,Di))) = Di impliesB−i(p,Bi(p,D−i))) =
D−i for D−i such that D−i = B−i(p,Di). For such D, then, D = BC(p, t) for
t ∈ D = Ds × Db. Alternatively, BC ⊂ T is a belief closed set if and only if
t, t0 ∈ BC implies there is chain t1, ..., tk, k ≥ 1, such that, for some i, j ∈ {b, s}
p(t1i , t
1
−i)p(t
2
i , t
1
−i)p(t
2
i , t
2
−i) · · · p(tnj , tn−1−j )p(tnj , tn−j) > 0.
Finally, if D is a belief closed set then so is T \D.
2.2 The Model
Let (a,m) ∈ {0, 1} × R describe an outcome of a bargaining procedure where
a = 1 if and only if trade takes place, and m ∈ R is a transfer from the buyer
to the seller. With outcome (a,m) the payoﬀ associated to the buyer with
valuation θ is u(a,m, θ) = aθ − m and the payoﬀ associated to the seller is
v(a,m) = m.
2.2.1 The Extensive Form
A standard position in noncooperative game theory is that any element of a
social situation that may aﬀect players behavior should be clearly spelled out
through the extensive game form that represents the strategic situation. The
game form should specify who moves when and what are the consequences of
all possible combinations of the moves. Thus non-commitment assumption, if
it makes sense, should also be describable by an extensive game form. Such
extensive form should be consistent with the idea that players cannot commit
to their past actions.
We take as a desideratum that a game form containing no commitment
power exhibits structural stationarity in a sense that players choice after any
history does not aﬀect the continuation extensive game form. That is, players
past choices do not aﬀect what they can achieve in the future. Note that a
game that meets this desideratum cannot have Þnite terminal histories - if it
had, then the players move at the node preceding terminal history would have
a dramatic eﬀect on the continuation extensive game. This in turn implies
that the game at hand cannot contain discounting - if it had, then all terminal
histories would generate zero payoﬀ.
Consider the following extensive game form g: Players move in a sequential
order, and there is no Þnite terminal history (any terminal history inÞnite). At
odd stages the seller makes an oﬀer (a,m) and at even stages the buyer either
accepts or rejects. If there is stage k from which onwards the seller always
oﬀers (a,m) and the buyer always accepts, then payoﬀs u(a,m, θ) and v(a,m)
are associated to the players. In all other cases, payoﬀs u(0, 0, θ) = 0 and
v(0, 0) = 0 are associated to the players.
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As the continuation game form is independent of the past history, game
form g satisÞes the desideratum stated above.15 Further motivation for the
game is provided in Section 5, where it is shown that equilibria induced by g
are coincide with equilibria of bargaining schemes that implement outcomes in
bounded time but that are robust against bound extensions.
Pure strategies σb and σs of the buyer and the seller deÞne an action for
each player after any Þnite history.16 Strategy σ = (σs,σb) then determines
players payoﬀs uniquely. Denote by h a typical history of g. Let p reßect
players prior beliefs. Given strategy σ, denote the beliefs associated to history
h by p(σ, h). Abusing the language slightly, pair (g, p) constitutes a bargaining
game.17
If there is a stage from which onwards the seller always oﬀers (a,m) and
the oﬀer is always accepted by the buyer, then we say players agree on (a,m)
from that stage onwards. Note that the game allows players agree also on not
implementing trade. If the seller oﬀers (1,m), then she is said to oﬀer price m.
There is no Þnite history at where players would know which outcome will
be implemented unless they know one anothers strategies in the continuation
game. On the other hand, if playerss strategies are common knowledge they
do become to know after Þnite history which outcome will be implemented, as
the next Lemma establishes.
Lemma 1 Fix p. Suppose players strategies σ are common knowledge. Then
there is stage K such that from K onwards it is common knowledge which
outcome will be implemented.
Proof. Let outcome function f : T → {0, 1} × R associate players to the
outcomes according to their common knowledge strategies σ. Take any (a,m) 6=
(0, 0). Denote by k(t) the stage from which onwards t ∈ f−1(a,m) ⊆ T always
agree on (a,m) under σ. By the construction of the game, and the deÞnition
of f, such k(t) exists. Since T is Þnite, k = max{k(t) : t ∈ f−1(a,m)} exists.
Now all types in f−1(a,m) ⊂ T agree on implementing (a,m) from k onwards.
Since f−1 is a partition of T , and since T is Þnite, there is the highest k0 such
that all types ∪(a,m)6=(0,0)f−1(a,m) agree on what outcome they will implement
from k0 onwards. Thus, if there is a deviation from a consent at some stage
higher than k0, then it must be by types in f−1(0, 0). Let K ≥ k0 be highest
stage where some of the types in f−1(0, 0) deviate from the consent of types
not in f−1(0, 0). Then from K onwards the outcome that is to be implemented
is common knowledge.
15Vartiainen (2003) argues that game form g, or an game form that is formally equivalent
to it, is the only game form that meets a larger set of desiderata for commitment-free game
forms.
16We focus on pure strategies. However, all our results would remain unchanged with Þnitely
mixed strategies. Feinberg-Skrzypacz (2002) explicitly use inÞnite mixing when constructing
an equilibrium that vielates the Coase conjecture. In our framework inÞnite mixing, which is
not an unproblematic concept, is a necessary condition to restore their result. InÞnite mixing
is further discussed in the end of Section 5.
17For notational simplicity, we refrain from including out-of-equilibrium beliefs into the
description of sequential equilibria. Implictly, of course, they are well deÞned.
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Lemma 1 is based on a very simple idea. If strategies are common knowledge,
and type sets Þnite, it must be common knowledge among players when the
they will at the most start agreeing on any (a,m) 6= (0, 0), if they are about to
implement it at the inÞnity. Thus, such maximal such stage is reached, they
also know that if none of these cases has materialized, then they are about to
implement (0, 0). Note that we could allow players use strategies that are mixed
in Þnitely many stages without aﬀecting Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 plays an important role in the analysis. The following Corollary,
which is employed later in the paper, is a direct consequence of Lemma 1.
Corollary 1 Suppose players strategies σ are common knowledge. Then there
is the least stage k ≥ 0 such that from k onwards it is always common knowledge
whether outcome (a,m) is implemented or not.
Proof. By Lemma 1, there is K after which it is common knowledge
whether outcome (a,m) is implemented or not, along with any equilibrium
history. Ask whether this holds for stage K−1, too. If not, we are done. If yes,
move to stage K − 2. Working backwards on the cardinality of the stages, one
Þnds the least stage k after which it is common knowledge whether outcome
(a,m) is implemented or not.
Suppose the buyer knows, or thinks he knows, the sellers strategy σs, as is
the case in sequential equilibria. Since the buyer always possesses the right to
force (0, 0) before any other outcome is materialized, his expectation of the equi-
librium outcome must always generate him nonnegative payoﬀ. Such property
of the game is called ex post individual rationality, or EXPIR for short.
We maintain the hypothesis that equilibrium strategies are common knowl-
edge. Given strategy σ and beliefs p, we say history h is on the oﬀ-the-
equilibrium path if it is common knowledge that it cannot be reached with
positive probability. On-the-equilibrium histories constitute the complement of
the oﬀ-the-equilibrium histories. Deviation by a player from the equilibrium
does not necessarily lead the game to an oﬀ-the-equilibrium history. On-the-
equilibrium beliefs are derived according to Bayes rule. The following consis-
tency assumption restricts beliefs also at the oﬀ-the-equilibrium histories.
Assumption Beliefs are common at any oﬀ-the-equilibrium history.
That is, players coordinate their beliefs even after zero probability occur-
rences.
2.2.2 Stable Set
The game supports many equilibria.18 Which to focus? We assume that the
seller has a leading role in equilibrium selection but, in consent with the non-
commitment idea, she cannot commit not to switch to a more proÞtable equi-
librium if such becomes available, rather than stick to an originally chosen
18Muthoo (1994) (see also Muthoo 1999) shows in a model where an oﬀer can be retracted
(but nonretracted oﬀer not) how to build up a continuum of equilibria. All of his equilibria
are supported by our game, too.
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equilibrium. Of course, in any admissible equilibrium deviations cannot take
place. A natural restriction for admissible equilibrium would then be that no
more proÞtable equilibria should become available once the players update their
beliefs along the equilibrium play. But the problem is that there may not be
any equilibrium that is seller-optimal in the class equilibria as information is
being revealed.
We now develop an equilibrium selection argument that allows the seller to
switch to another equilibrium if and only if such swift is dynamically consis-
tent. Equilibria that are non-upset according to this criterion are then deemed
admissible, or stable.
Given beliefs p, sequential equilibrium (SE) (σ, p) is upset by equilibrium
(σ0, p0) if it is common knowledge that the seller prefers the latter equilibrium at
some point on the equilibrium path of Þrst one. Thus, the commitment problem
induces a relation on equilibria (σ, p) and (σ0, p0). To model such relation more
formally, let A be the graph of the equilibrium correspondence.
A = {(σ, p) : σ is SE, p ∈ ∆}.
Then the the sellers commitment problem spans a partial order onA as follows:
Definition 1 Equilibrium (σ, p) is upset by equilibrium (σ0, p) if p0 = p(σ, h)
for some terminal history h on-the-equilibrium path of σ, and it is common
knowledge that the seller strictly prefers (σ0, p0) over (σ, p) at h.
Any upset equilibrium is destabilized by the upsetting equilibrium. But this
may mot be the end of the story. What if the upsetting equilibrium is itself
upset by a third equilibrium, this by fourth, and so on? Which equilibria can
the seller commit herself to? We solve the problem by imposing a dynamic
consistency constraint on the equilibrium selection rule: any stable equilibrium
should not be upset by another stable equilibrium, and any unstable equilibrium
should be upset by some stable equilibrium.
Definition 2 Set G ⊂ A is stable if:
1. (Internal stability) No element of G is upset by an element in G.
2. (External stability) Every element not in G is upset by an element in G.
The aim of the rest of the paper is to characterize properties of stable
sets. The terms external and internal stability are drawn from the literature on
vonNeumann-Morgenstern stable standards of behavior.19 In the current set
up, external and internal stabilities describe Markovian decision making that is
dynamically consistent in the following sense.
To gain some intuition, interpret the equilibrium selection problem itself as
a game where the seller is the only mover, and where the buyer accommodates
to the declaration of an equilibrium as long as the seller commit to it. Think
19Cf. von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944). For comprehensive application of the stable set
apparatus, see Greenberg (1991).
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an equilibrium as a machine that takes as input a prior distribution and as an
output the Þnal posterior distribution along the equilibrium path.20 The seller
must now come up with a plan tells which equilibria she can commit to even if
she entitled to implement a new equilibrium once a posterior of the implemented
equilibrium has been materialized. Which equilibria can the seller commit to?
First, divide the set of equilibria to those she can commit to and those she
cannot. A direct implication of sequential rationality is that given that she can
commit to equilibrium A in the Þrst group there cannot be equilibrium B that
she can commit to and that she prefers over A, given the posterior generated
by A. On the other hand, if she cannot commit to equilibrium A, then there
must be equilibrium B that she can commit to and that she prefers over A,
given the posterior generated by A. Thus external and external stabilities can
be viewed as a necessary condition for dynamically consistent decision making
under non-commitment.
Note that as upsetting takes place only on-the-equilibrium path, stability
does not impose any restriction on players oﬀ-the-equilibrium beliefs. For any
p ∈ ∆, the belief closed set BC(p, t) and hence the least possible valuation
θ(BC(p, t)) is well deÞned and common knowledge in BC(p, t), for all t ∈ S(p).
3 Binary Valuations
It is instructive to Þrst characterize stable set in the binary valuations case.
Let Θ = {θ0, θ1} with 0 < θ0 < θ1. First we solve the existence question by
constructing a particular stable set. Then we go on to show that there cannot
be any other stable sets.
For any p, construct the following simple equilibrium strategy σp. Given
t ∈ S(p), the seller always oﬀers price θ(BC(p, t)), the buyer always accepts
oﬀer θ(BC(p, t)) and rejects any other oﬀer. Oﬀ-the-equilibrium actions do not
aﬀect priors. If players adhere these instructions, then no information is ever
revealed and trade with price θ(BC(p, t)) is implemented.
It is clear that (σp, p) constitutes a sequential equilibrium. There is no prof-
itable deviation, one-shoot or inÞnite, for either player.21
Construct set G∗ as follows:
G∗ = {(σ, p) : not upset by (σq, q), q ∈ ∆}.
That is, G∗ comprises all equilibria (σ, p) that are not upset by price oﬀers
θ(BC(q, t)), where posterior q is derived along the equilibrium path of (σ, p).
Note that (σp, p) is not upset by (σp, p), and thus (σp, p) ∈ G∗, for all p ∈ ∆.
Lemma 2 (σ, p) ∈ G∗ only if it is common knowledge along the equilibrium
path that θ(BC(p, t)) will become implemented, for all t ∈ S(p).
20Thus we assume that the equilibrium decision rule is dependent only on the current beliefs.
Hence the decision problem has much Markovian ßavor.
21 In the current set up, one-shoot-deviation principle may not be suﬃcient condition for
sequential equilibrium.
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Proof. Take (σ, p) ∈ G∗. Since (σ, p) is not upset by any (σq, q), (σ, p)
implements trade with probability one with price at least θ(BC(p, t)), for all
t ∈ S(p). Since trade always takes place, and since type tb ∈ θ−1(θ(BC(p, t)))
can at most get zero payoﬀ, tb only trades with price m = θ(BC(p, t)).
Suppose that the Lemma does not hold. Then, since Θ is a binary set,
(σ, p) implements price strictly higher than θ(BC(p, t)) = θ0 under some t0 ∈
BC(p, t). Since equilibrium strategies are common knowledge, identify set H
of on-the equilibrium histories at which it becomes common knowledge that
price higher than θ0 is to be implemented. Pick h¯ ∈ H that is the longest of
all histories in H. By Corollary 1, such longest history exists. Let p¯ be the
posterior belief at h¯, before price higher than θ0 becomes common knowledge,
and p0 a typical posterior belief immediately after h¯, when price higher than θ0
is common knowledge. Since after h¯ it is common knowledge whether price θ0
or higher is to be implemented, it follows from EXPIR that θ(BC(p0, t)) = θ1.
Since (σ, p) is not upset by (σp
0
, p0), the implemented price is θ1. Thus, after
h¯, either price θ0 or θ1 is common knowledge.
First we argue that the player who moves at h¯ cannot be the buyer. Suppose,
to the contrary, that the buyer is the mover. Let Db ⊂ Bb(p¯, t) constitute the
set of types of the buyer whose choice at h¯ make price θ0 common knowledge.
After p0 is induced by t0s ∈ Bb(p¯, t) \ Db, it becomes common knowledge that
price θ1 will be implemented. By EXPIR, types t0s ∈ Bb(p¯, t) \Db valuation is
θ1. Thus, by choosing her equilibrium action, type t0b ∈ Bb(p¯, t) \Db gets zero
payoﬀ. By imitating tb ∈ Db type t0b induces payoﬀ θ1 − θ0 when any ts such
that p¯(t0b, ts)p¯(tb, ts) > 0 materializes. When such ts does not materialize, t
0
b
still guarantees zero payoﬀ by EXPIR.
Since after h¯ it will be common knowledge whether trade with price θ0 will
be implemented, it must be that Db = Bb(p¯, Bs(p¯,Db))), as otherwise some
type t0b ∈ Bb(p¯, Bs(p¯, Db))) \ Db would strictly beneÞt from imitating type in
Db. But this implies that Db = BCb(p¯, t) for all t ∈ Db. Consequently, also
Sb(p¯) \ Db = BCb(p¯, t), for all tb ∈ Sb(p¯) \ Ds. Because of this, it must be
common knowledge at h¯ that types in Db implement price θ0 and in Sb(p¯) \Ds
implement price θ1. A contradiction.
The player who moves at h¯ must be the seller. Let Ds ⊂ Bs(p¯) constitute
the set of types of the seller whose choice at h¯make price θ0 common knowledge.
After p0 is induced by ts ∈ Bs(p¯)\Ds, it becomes common knowledge that price
θ1 will be implemented. By choosing her equilibrium action, type ts ∈ Ds gets
payoﬀ θ0. By imitating t0s ∈ Bs(p¯) \Db, type ts induces payoﬀ θ1 when any tb
such that p¯(tb, t0s)p¯(tb, ts) > 0 materializes. When such tb does not materialize,
buyers choice after h¯ reveals publicly that the seller has falsely imitated ts.
Let p00 reßect the common belief under such out-of-equilibrium information set.
Since any (σ0, p00) ∈ G∗ is not upset by any (σq, q), (σ0, p00) implements trade
with price at least θ0. Thus, ts guarantees θ0 payoﬀ, even after imitating t0s.
Since no information is revealed after h¯, it must be thatDs = Bs(p¯, Bb(p¯, Ds))).
Otherwise some type ts ∈ Ds would strictly beneÞt from imitating type in
Bs(p¯, Bb(p¯, Ds))) \ Ds. But this implies that Ds = BCs(p¯, t) for all t ∈ Ds.
Consequently, also Ss(p¯) \ Ds = BCs(p¯, t), for all ts ∈ Ss(p¯) \ Ds. Because of
this, it must be common knowledge at h¯ that types in Ss(p¯) \Ds have valua-
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tion θ1. Since (σ, p) is not upset at h¯, it is also common knowledge that types
in Ss(p¯) \ Ds implement price θ1. Thus it is common knowledge at h¯ which
outcome will become implemented, to the contrary of the assumption.
The proof of the Lemma 2 is roughly as follows: By Lemma 1, there is a Þnite
set of histories on the equilibrium path where it becomes common knowledge
that trade with price θ0 will not be implemented. Thus, one can also identify
the longest history h¯ after which this becomes common knowledge. After h¯
but not before it is then common knowledge whether price θ0 or higher will
be implemented. Since the equilibrium is not upset by any simple equilibrium
and since any equilibrium meets the EXPIR constraint, it follows that any
implemented price is coincides with θ0 or θ1. In the former case the least possible
valuation of the buyer is θ0 and in the latter θ1. The rest of the proof argues
that neither the buyer nor seller can commit to reveal which is the case: in
the latter case the seller is tempted to mimic the former, and in the former
the buyer is tempted to mimic the latter. Thus information cannot be revealed
credibly by neither party. This implies that the seller is forced to sell with price
θ0.22
Theorem 1 G∗ is a stable set.
Proof. Since (σp, p) ∈ G∗, for all p ∈ ∆, external stability is met. For
internal stability, note that (σ, p) ∈ G∗ implies by Lemma 2 that it is common
knowledge at all decision nodes along the equilibrium path that θ(B(p, t)) will
be implemented. But then (σ0, p0) ∈ G∗ implements θ(B(p, t)) if θ(B(p, t)) =
θ(B(p0, t)). Thus (σ0, p0) cannot upset (σ, p).
Since (σp, p) ∈ G∗, the only nonobvious part of the proof is internal stability.
But this is implies by Lemma 2 which says that any two stable equilibria must
be equivalent in terms of outcome expectations, and hence they cannot upset
one another. Thus G∗ meets both criteria.
No we turn to the question of uniqueness. First we argue that if G is a
stable set, then G ⊆G∗.
Lemma 3 Let G be a stable set. If (σ, q) ∈ G, then (σ, q) is not upset by
(σp, p), for any p.
Proof. Suppose (σ, q) is upset by (σp, p). By internal stability, (σp, p) 6∈G∗.
By external stability, there is (σ0, p) ∈ G∗ that upsets (σp, p). But then (σ0, p)
also upsets (σ, q), a contradiction.
By Lemma 3, (σ, q) ∈ G implies (σ, q) ∈ G∗. Now we prove the other
direction: if G and G∗ are stable sets, then G∗ ⊆G.
Lemma 4 Let G be a stable set. If (σ, q) is not upset by (σp, p), for any p,
then (σ, q) ∈ G.
22 It should be noted that sequentiality of bargaining is crucial for the result. Because of
sequentiality, the problem becomes dominance solvable à la Rubinstein (1989).
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Proof. Suppose (σ, q) is not upset by (σp, p), for any p, but (σ, q) ∈ G∗\G.
By external stability, there is (σ, p) ∈ G that upsets (σ, q). By Lemma 3,
G ⊆G∗, and hence (σ, p) ∈ G∗. But then (σ, q) ∈ G∗ and (σ, p) ∈ G∗ violate
internal stability, a contradiction
By Lemma 4, (σ, q) ∈ G∗ implies (σ, q) ∈ G. Collecting the Lemmata, a
uniqueness result follows.
Theorem 2 If G is a stable set, then G =G∗.
Thus, the good is always traded with price θ0 if (1) the seller knows the
buyers reservation valuation, (2) the buyer knows the seller knows (1), (3) the
seller knows (2), ..., (k) player i does not know (k-1). We become to show that
even if the seller is privately informed about the buyers valuation, she cannot
commit not sell the good to the buyer if she cannot commit to her oﬀers. Our
conclusion is that the seller can take advantage of her private information only
if she simultaneously possesses some commitment power.
4 General Finite Case
The previous analysis concentrates on the binary reservation valuations case.
The restriction is unappealing but, unfortunately, necessary forG∗ to be stable.
Nevertheless, we argue that unqueness result remains valid in more general set
up.
Assume the set of buyers valuations is {θ0, ..., θK} such that 0 < θ0 < · · · <
θK . Again, let T be a Þnite set and let us focus on pure strategy equilibria.
First we develop an algorithm that generates a stable set, and proves that the
stable set is unique.
Theorem 3 Stable set exists and is unique.
Proof. Construct a following algorithm:
G0 = {(σ, p) : not upset by any (σ, q) ∈ A} ,
B1 =
©
(σ, p) : upset by some (σ, q) ∈G0ª ,
G1 =
n
(σ, p) : not upset by any (σ, q) ∈ A \B1
o
,
...
Bk =
n
(σ, p) : upset by some (σ, q) ∈ Gk−1
o
,
Gk =
n
(σ, p) : not upset by any (σ, q) ∈ A \Bk
o
,
...
It is clear that G0 = ∅ (take the class of degenerate distributions p(t) = 1 and
let σ choose maximal EXPIR outcome). Note that Bk ⊆ Bk+1 and Gk ⊆Gk+1
for all k. Thus if ∪∞k=1[Gk ∪Bk] = A, then G¯ = G∞ exists and is the unique
stable set.
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Suppose (σ, p) ∈ A \ ∪∞k=1(Gk ∪Bk). If
(σ, p) 6∈Gk ∪Bk for all k = 0, ...,
then, by de Morgans law,
(σ, p) is upset by some (σ, q) ∈ [A \Bk]\Gk−1 = A \ [Gk−1∪Bk], for all k = 1, ... .
Since [Gk−1 ∪Bk] ⊂ [Gk ∪Bk+1] for all k, we have
(σ, p) is upset by some (σ, q) ∈ A \ ∪∞k=1[Gk−1 ∪Bk].
Applying the same argument inductively to the upsetting equilibria, we can,
then, construct a sequence of equilibria {(σk, pk)}∞k=0 such that (σk, qk) ∈
A \ ∪∞k0=1[Gk
0−1 ∪ Bk0 ] for all k, and such that (σk+1, pk+1) upsets (σk, pk).
Of all such sequences, pick a one that meets the following additional property:
(σk+1, pk+1) = (σp
k
, pk) if (σk, pk) 6= (σpk , pk) ∈ A \ ∪∞k=1[Gk−1 ∪Bk].
Since T is Þnite and strategies are pure, there is L and p such that pl = p for
all l > L, and such that (σp˜, p) ∈ ∪∞k=1[Gk−1∪Bk] = [∪∞k=0Gk]∪[∪∞k=1Bk]. Since
prior p does not change, it must be that under σl+1 players agree to implement
price higher than under σl. By EXPIR, (σp˜, p) upsets (σl, p) for all l > L. Since
(σl, p) 6∈ [∪∞k=0Gk] ∪ [∪∞k=1Bk], it follows that (σp˜, p) ∈ ∪∞k=1Bk. Thus, since
(σp˜, p) is a constant equilibrium, (σp˜, p) is upset by some (σ0, p) ∈ Gk, for some
k. But then (σ0, p) ∈ Gk also upsets (σl, p) 6∈ Bk+1, a contradiction.
The algorithm starts from those equilibria that are inherently stable, namely
those that are not upset by any other equilibria. For example, if θ(BC(p, t)) =
{θ0}, then it is common knowledge that the buyers reservation valuation is
θ0 and, given EXPIR, (σp, p) cannot by upset by any (σ, p). Thus (σp, p) ∈ G0
belongs to the stable set. The inductive step is to identify set B1 whose all
elements are upset by an element in G0. These cannot belong to the stable
set. The second inductive step is identify set G1 whose all elements are not
upset by an element of the complement of B0. These in turn must belong to
the stable set; they can only be upset by an element outside stable set. Then
we continue like this, adding on the one hand to the stable set elements that
certainly belong there and, on the other, to the unstable set those elements
that cannot belong to the stable set. Finally, we show that that the union of
the evolving stable and unstable set exhausts all the equilibria. This implies
that a stable set exists and that it is unique. Of course, in the binary valuations
case, the unique stable set is G∗.
In the general case, the structure of the stable set is diﬃcult to describe.
However, we can show that any stable equilibrium is eﬃcient.
Theorem 4 Let G be a stable set. If (σ, q) ∈ G, then (σ, q) implements trade
with probability one.
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Proof. If (σ, q) does not implement trade with probability one, then there
is stage from which onwards it is common knowledge that (0, 0) will be imple-
mented. Let p reßect beliefs at this stage. Then (σp, p) upsets (σ, q). But by
Lemma 3 this leads to contradiction.
To see whyG∗ fails to constitute a stable set in the multiple valuations case,
consider the following example.
Example 1 Let Θ = {θ0, θ1, θ2} such that θ1 = (θ0 + θ2)/2, and let T = Θ×
{t0, t1}. Find p such that p(θ0, t0) = p(θ1, t1) = 1/3, p(θ2, t0) = p(θ2, t1) = 1/6.
Construct sellers strategy σs where t0 and t1 Þrst oﬀer θ1.
 If the Þrst oﬀer is accepted, then t0 and t1 always oﬀer θ1.
 If the Þrst oﬀer is not accepted, then t0 always oﬀers θ0, and t1 always
oﬀers θ2.
Construct buyers strategy σb where θ0 always accepts any oﬀer at most θ0,
and θ1 and θ2 always accept any oﬀer at most θ1. If the seller observes a zero
probability action by the seller, then she believes the deviator is θ2.
To see why the constructed strategy constitutes an equilibrium, observe
that no one shoot nor inÞnite deviation can improve any players position. In
particular, neither θ1 nor θ2 beneÞt from downgrading their valuations as this
would lead in the Þrst case to the eventual no trade, and in the second to trade
with price θ1. We now argue that existence of equilibrium (σ, p) implies G∗
cannot be a stable set. To verify that (σ, p) constitutes an element of G∗, note
that if price θ0 is to implemented, then θ(BC(p0, t)) = θ0 for any second period
equilibrium posterior. Thus (σ, p) is not upset by any (σp
0
, p0). On the other
hand, the same applies to (σp, p), which trades with price θ(BC(p, t)) = θ0,
for all t ∈ S(p). But now (σp, p) is upset by (σ, p) implying that G∗ violates
internal stability.23
Belief Monotonicity However, under certain restriction on priors, we
can say more. Next we argue that the outcome of the bargaining procedure is
uniquely determined whenever the set-up contains some degree of monotonicity.
The following condition captures a monotonicity restriction the is suﬃcient for
uniqueness:
Definition 3 (Belief monotonicity) If θ(tb) < θ(t0b) < θ(t
00
b ) and p(tb, ts)p(t
00
b , ts) >
0, then p(t0b, ts) > 0, for all tb, t
0
b, t
00
b ∈ BCb(p, t), and for all ts ∈ BCs(p, t).
23Note that equilibrium presented in the Example can also be supported as an equilibrium
of the standard one-sided oﬀers bargaining game when the discount factor approaches unity.
Thus with more than two valuations, the Feinberg-Skrzypacz result can be obtained with
without appealing to inÞnitely mixed strategies that do not implement an outcome within a
bound.
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That is, if the seller sees two valuations of the buyer possible, and there is
a third valuation that cannot be ruled out on the common knowledge grounds
that lies in between the two valuations, then the seller conceives also the middle
valuation possible. Thus the property guarantees that there are no holes in
the beliefs of the seller.
Theorem 5 Let G be stable set and let p satisfy beliefs monotonicity. Then
(σ, p) ∈G if and only if σ always sells the good with price BC(p, t).
Proof. W.l.o.g., assume BC(p, t) = T, for all t. Denote a typical element
of θ−1(θk) by tkb , for k = 0, ...,K. Since p satisÞes belief monotonicity, if there
is t0b , ts such that p(t
0
b , ts)p(t
k
b , ts) > 0 for k > 2, then p(t
1
b , ts) > 0 for some t
1
b .
Suppose the latter does not hold. Then p(t0b , ts)p(t
k
b , ts) = 0 for k > 2 for all
(t0b , ts) ∈ θ−1(θ0)×Ts. Then Bb(p,Bs(p, t0b)) ⊆ θ−1(θ0), for all t0b ∈ θ−1(θ0) and,
consequently, Bb(p,Bs(p, θ−1(θ0))) = BCb(p, t0b). Then Tb = θ
−1(θ0).
By EXPIR it follows that t0b trades with price at most θ
0. Suppose t0b trades
with price lower than θ0 under some types. By Corollary 1, this fact will become
common knowledge after some Þnite history. Let q be the posterior at such
history. Since (σ, q) is upset by (σq, q), it follows that (σq, q) 6∈ G. Thus there
is (σ0, q) ∈ G that upsets (σq, q). But then (σ0, q) also upsets (σ, q) and, a
fortiori, (σ, p), a contradiction. Thus t0b trades with price θ
0, and the Lemma
is established.
Suppose now that p(t1b , ts) > 0 for some t
1
b . We claim that type t
1
b trades
with price θ0 as well. Suppose not. Fix equilibrium σ, and call the play path
played with positive probability in the equilibrium under t0b by t
0
b−equilibrium
path. Let σkb be buyer t
k
b s and σ
k
s be seller t
k
s s equilibrium strategy. Then σ
k
b
and σks specify for each history an action. By imitating σ
0
b on the t
0
b−equilibrium
path, buyer t1b induces payoﬀ θ
1 − θ0 when ts materializes. When such ts does
not materialize, t1b still guarantees zero payoﬀ, by EXPIR. Thus t
1
b s equilibrium
strategy must generate him positive payoﬀ.
If there is a history on the t0b−equilibrium path at which σ0b and σ1b do not co-
incide, then it becomes common knowledge that buyers type is at least θ1. Let
p0 denote the posterior belief at such history. Suppose (σ, p0) is upset by (σp0 , p0).
By internal stability, (σp
0
, p0) 6∈ G∗. By external stability, there is (σ0, p0) ∈ G∗
that upsets (σp
0
, p0). But then (σ0, p0) also upsets (σ, p), a contradiction. Since
(σ, p0) is not upset by (σp0 , p0), the implemented price is θ(BC(p0, t)) ≥ θ1, for
all t ∈ S(p0). But this implies that t1b s equilibrium strategy generates him
zero payoﬀ. Thus σ1b coincides with σ
0
b on the t
0
b−equilibrium path. Thus if σ1b
and σ0b do not coincide, then it must be out of the t
0
b−equilibrium path. This
implies that the player who moves the game out of the t0b−equilibrium path is
the seller.
We now argue that this is not possible. Since p satisÞes belief monotonicity,
there is t0s such that p(t
0
b , t
0
s)p(t
1
b , t
0
s) > 0. If there is ts that moves the game
out of the t0b−equilibrium path when t1b is present but not when t0b is present, it
must be the case that ts can condition his action on the realization of buyers
type in {t0b , t1b}. This is possible only if t0b 6∈ Bb(p, ts) and t1b ∈ Bb(p, ts). Thus
t0s 6= ts. By imitating tss strategy on the t0b−equilibrium path, seller t0s induces
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payoﬀ θ1 when t1b materializes. When t
0
b materializes, σ
1
b and σ
0
b do not coincide
at the out of t0b−equilibrium path, and hence it is publicly revealed that the
seller has falsely imitated ts. Let p00 reßect the common belief under such out-
of-equilibrium information set. As above, any (σ0, p00) ∈ G implements trade
with price at least θ0. Thus, t0s guarantees payoﬀ θ
0, even when t0b materializes.
This implies that the player who moves the game out of the t0b−equilibrium
path cannot be the seller. Thus t1b trades with price θ
0.
Finally, use the argument inductively to prove that tkb trades with price
θk−1, if t0b , ..., t
k−1
b trade with price θ
0. Then any tkb , k = 0, ...,K trades with
price θ0.
The simplest example is the standard one where the seller does not have
any private information, that is Ts is single valued. Then, under the common
prior assumption, p(tb, ts) > 0 for all (tb, ts) ∈ T and belief monotonicity is
automatically met. Thus, by Theorem 5, we get the standard Coase conjecture
outcome:24
Corollary 2 If sellers beliefs are common knowledge, then trade takes place
with price θ0 in any equilibrium belonging to the stable set.
Another scenario where monotonicity automatically binds is where it is com-
mon knowledge that the seller receives a private and noisy signal about buyers
valuation. This structure is familiar from the Global Games literature.
Suppose there are nonnegative numbers l and h such that l+h > 0, and let
the belief structure p satisfy
T = {θ0, ..., θK} × {t0, ..., tK}, (1)
θ(θk) = θk and
min{k+h,K}Y
k0=max{k−l,0}
p(θk
0
, tk) > 0, for all k = 0, ...,K.
That is, the sellers only knows his payoﬀ relevant type and the buyer privately
receives a noisy signal about buyers valuation. Structure of the signal common
knowledge. By assumption, this structure satisÞes belief monotonicity: Take
θ < θ0 < θ00 and ts. If p(θ, ts)p(θ00, ts) > 0, then by (1) also p(θ, ts)p(θ0, ts)p(θ00, ts) >
0. Thus p(θ0, ts) > 0.
More interesting is that as the buyer only gets to know his valuation, and
he updates his beliefs over the sellers signal in an imperfect manner. By con-
struction, therefore,
either
K−1Y
k=0
p(θk+1, tk)p(θk, tk) > 0,
or
KY
k=1
p(θk−1, tk)p(θk, tk) > 0.
24Excepts that there may be costless delays.
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Thus, BC(p, t) = T and hence θ0 = θ(BC(p, t)) for all t ∈ T . Since this
structure satisÞes belief monotonicity, we have by Theorem 5 that trade always
takes place with price θ0.
Corollary 3 If the buyer only knows his valuation and the seller receives noisy
private signal about the buyers valuation, as deÞned in 1, then trade takes place
with price θ0 in any equilibrium equilibrium belonging to the stable set.
Thus, even if the seller knows the buyer has valuation of at least θk > θ0,
she is forced to sell with price above θ0.
5 Equilibrium Bounded Bargaining Schemes
An obvious conceptual problem with game form g is that it never actually im-
plements trade. One could argue that reasonable bargaining theory should not
allow bargaining to continue without a bound. In this section we provide fur-
ther justiÞcation for the construction of g by showing that equilibrium outcome
functions under g and only those survive if one focuses on equilibrium bounded
bargaining procedures that are robust against bound extensions. That is, those
bargaining procedures that in equilibrium are bounded to end in Þnite time, but
which do not crucially depend on the commitment aid provided by the bound.
By Lemma 1 we know that when players strategies are common knowledge
it will sooner or later be common knowledge which outcome is eventually im-
plemented, even though implementation does not ever take place. Could not,
then, players agree on executing the trade immediately when the outcome is
common knowledge rather than at the inÞnity?
Let us now formalize this idea. Assume that the seller and the buyer want
to implement trade once the outcome becomes common knowledge. Thus, be-
fore the game (g, p) starts, they have to simultaneously agree on the stage of
the game when they implement the trade conditional on realized messages, and
on their communication strategies (through oﬀers and acceptances/rejections)
up to the implementation stage. Agreed communication must constitute an
equilibrium. Thus out-of-equilibrium consequence must be deÞned as well.
When players observe an out-of-equilibrium move, they agree on a new strategy-
implementation plan given their (common) out-of-equilibrium beliefs. And af-
ter an out-of-equilibrium move from this, they agree on a still new strategy-
implementation plan given their beliefs, and so forth. Thus the system of sub-
game equilibria conditional on prior beliefs has to be designed such a way that
(i) no player ever deviates, and (ii) with any prior an outcome is implemented
in Þnite time. Of course, principles (i) and (ii) has to be applied to deviation
from the equilibrium path following an out-of-equilibrium move, and so forth.
To tailor such equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme, take bargaining strat-
egy σ of extensive form g. Starting from history h, denote the positive proba-
bility play-path under σ and prior p by (σ, p, h). Let p0 be the initial beliefs
and h0 the initial history of g. Construct game form gB inductively according
to the following procedure:
19
Step 0. Take an even integer K0, a bound, and choose (p, h,K) = (p0, h0,K0).
Go to Step 1.
Step 1. Truncate g immediately after the Kth stage on the play-path (σ, p, h) by
implementing (a,m) if it is the most recent oﬀer and it been accepted.
Otherwise implement (0, 0).
Step 2. After deviation from the play-path (σ, p, h) to history h0 at or before the
Kth stage, choose new prior p0 and even integer K 0. Choose (p, h,K) =
(p0, h0,K 0) and go to step 1.
Thus, given σ, we construct game tree gB by imposing a uniform Þnite bound
on g on-the-play-path (σ, p0, h0), on-the-play-path of (σ, p0, h0) where where p0
is any oﬀ-the-play-path belief associated to history h0 that follows a deviation
from (σ, p0, h0), and so forth. Continuing inductively, we simultaneously come
up with a system of beliefs and a system of Þnite bounds.
The system of bounds deÞnes a game tree that is a truncated version of
g. Any Þnite terminal history of the tree associates to an outcome. By letting
any inÞnite sequence of actions implement outcome (0, 0),25 we come up with
a proper game form which we call gB. The corresponding truncated version of
strategy σ, deÞned on gB, is denoted by σB. Thus σ and σB coincide on gB.
Given prior p, call triple (gB,σB, p) as a bargaining scheme.26 We say that
this bargaining scheme is equilibrium bounded if (σB, p) also constitutes a se-
quential equilibrium of gB. If bargaining scheme (gB,σB, p) is equilibrium
bounded, then equilibrium (σB, p) of game gB implements an outcome in Þ-
nite time. Abusing the language, call K as the initial bound and σK as the
initial equilibrium of (gB,σB, p).
The concept of equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme allows us to evaluate
the importance of the commitment assumption, that is, existence of bounds. If
the equilibrium (σB, p) is not dependent on the commitment power provided
by bounds K, then one should be able to extend them without aﬀecting the
equilibrium behavior. Our goal is to characterize such bounded equilibria that
are robust against bound extensions.
Suppose (gB,σB, p) is an equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme. Take
L ∈ {0, 2, 4, ...}. We say that bargaining scheme (g0,σ0, p) is an L-extension of
(gB,σB, p) if (i) g0 is derived from gB by extending all bounds for L stages, (ii)
σ0 and σB coincide within gB, and (iii) on the play-path from any bound, sayK,
onwards, σ repeats the actions taken by σB at stages K − 1,K. Thus (g0,σ0, p)
and (gB,σB, p) coincide whenever the former is deÞned, and they induce the
same outcomes. If (gB,σB, p) can be L−extended, then extending the bound
does not aﬀect the equilibrium in a meaningful way.
Definition 4 Equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme (gB,σB, p) is robust against
bound extensions if there is an equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme that is
an L−extension of (gB,σB, p), for any even integer L.
25 InÞnite strategies never materialize in equilibrium.
26As before, we drop disequilibrium beliefs from the description of an equilibrium bounded
scheme. Implicitly, such beliefs are correctly deÞned.
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That is, if (gB,σB, p) is robust against bound extensions, then the length
of a bounded the one-sided-oﬀers bargaining game can be extended without af-
fecting players behavior nor the resulting outcomes. Robustness against bound
extensions implicates ability to commit to a particular behavior even if physical
commitment devices are removed.
Denote by f(· : g,σ) : S(p)→ A×R the outcome function induced by game
g and strategy σ, given prior p.
Definition 5 Triple (g,σ, p), where σ constitutes an equilibrium of g under p,
is outcome equivalent to an equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme (gB,σB, p)
if f(· : gB,σB) = f(· : g,σ). It is an extension equivalent if it meets the criteria
of ∞−extension of (gB,σB, p).
If (g,σ, p) and (gB,σB, p) are outcome equivalent, then they induce the
same outcomes given the data of types. If (g,σ, p) and (gB,σB, p) are extension
equivalent, then they are not only outcome equivalent but the strategies also
agree on the truncated game gB, and no information is revealed within (g,σ, p)
beyond the bounds imposed by gB.
Before establishing the theorems, call equilibrium (σ, p) of g regular if play-
ers agree on outcome (0, 0) rather than never agree on any other outcome when-
ever they end up implementing outcome (0, 0). The assumption of regularity
is strategically immaterial. For any equilibrium (σ0, p) there exists a regular
equilibrium (σ, p) that coincides with (σ0, p) before stage, say, K when (0, 0)
becomes common knowledge (by Lemma 1, suchK exists), and afterwards agree
on (0, 0). Agreeing on (0, 0) can be supported as equilibrium from K onwards
by punishing any deviant with the same punishment as in the original strategy.
Theorem 6 The set of outcome functions induced by equilibria σ of g under p
is equivalent with the set of outcome functions induced by equilibrium bounded
bargaining schemes (gB,σB, p) that are robust against bound extensions.
Proof. Only if: Suppose σ constitutes an equilibrium of g under p.
W.l.o.g. assume that σ is regular. First we derive an equilibrium bounded bar-
gaining scheme (gB,σB, p) that is outcome equivalent to (g,σ, p). Given initial
history h and equilibrium (σ, p), identify an even stage K from which onwards
the implemented outcome is common knowledge under (σ, p, h). Similarly, to
any oﬀ-the-equilibrium history h0 and beliefs p0 reachable from (σ, p), identify
stage K 0 from which onwards the implemented outcome is common knowledge
under (σ, p0, h0). By Lemma 1, such stages exist for any prior p0. Working
inductively we come up with strategy σB and, simultaneously, game form gB.
Since σ is regular, (gB,σB, p) and (g,σ, p) are outcome equivalent. Thus it
suﬃces to show that (gB,σB, p) is robust against bound extensions. Construct
an L−extension (g0,σ0, p) of (gB,σB, p), for any L = 0, 2, 4, ... . By construction,
no new information is revealed from the bounds onwards under (g,σ, p). Hence,
between any old and new bound in the equilibrium path, one shoot deviation
from (g0,σ0, p) is not proÞtable if deviation from (gB,σB, p) is not proÞtable.
Thus, since (gB,σB, p) constitutes an equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme,
so does (g0,σ0, p).
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If: Suppose that (gB,σB, p) is a robust equilibrium bounded bargaining
scheme. Construct strategy σ that coincides with σB on gB, and from any
bound, say K, onwards, σ repeats the actions taken by σB at stages K − 1,K.
By construction, (g,σ, p) is outcome equivalent to any equilibrium bounded
bargaining scheme that is an extension of (gB,σB, p). We need to show that σ
constitutes an equilibrium of g under p. Suppose not. There are two cases:
(i) A player deviates from σ afterK. Suppose a deviation takes place at stage
K 0 > K. Since (g,σ, p) is equivalent to equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme
(g0,σ0, p) that is a (K 0−K)−extension of (gB,σB, p), the expected payoﬀs from
deviation are the same as from deviating from (g0,σ0, p). This contradicts the
assumption that (g0,σ0, p) is an equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme.
(ii) A player deviates from σ at or before K. The expected payoﬀs from de-
viating from σ at or before K are the same as from deviating from (gB,σB, p) at
or before K. This contradicts the assumption that (gB,σB, p) is an equilibrium
bounded bargaining scheme.
That is, looking at equilibria of g under p is outcome equivalent to looking
at the robust equilibrium bounded bargaining schemes under p. Thus, game
(g, p) can be seen as a reÞnement vehicle: focusing on equilibria of (g, p) forces
us to drop out those equilibrium bounded bargaining schemes that are crucially
dependent on the bound. Therefore, the inÞnite version of the game reÞnes all
equilibria of a Þnite game that are not robust against increasing the number of
stages. Under such interpretation, we are focusing on situations where players
agree on a scheme to exchange information until a stage where they can commit
not change information any more, and then they execute the trade.
Note that any equilibrium σ of game (g, p) that always induces trade is also
regular. Thus by the only if part of the proof of Theorem 6, any equilibrium
σ that always induces trade satisÞes the property that there is an outcome
equivalent equilibrium σB of a robust equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme
(gB,σB, p) that has the additional property that σ coincides with σB on gB,
and agrees on the implemented outcome beyond the bounds imposed by gB.
Theorem 7 If equilibrium σ of game (g, p) induces trade with probability one,
then (g,σ, p) is extension equivalent to an equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme
(gB,σB, p) that is robust against bound extensions.
Proof. Construct an equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme (gB,σB, p)
from (g,σ, p) as in the only if -part of the proof of Theorem 6. By construction,
(g,σ, p) is extension equivalent to an equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme
(gB,σB, p). Since no new information is revealed from the bounds onwards
under (g,σ, p), we have that (gB,σB, p) is robust against bound extensions.
That is, if σ always induces trade, then the truncated version of σ constitutes
an equilibrium of a bounded game that implements trade in Þnite time, just
as the conjectured in the beginning of this section. Since any equilibria in the
stable set always induces trade, it follows that stable equilibria can also be
implemented by equilibrium bounded schemes that are robust against bound
extensions.
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Let AR be the subgraph of A that consists of equilibria of g that are exten-
sion equivalent to robust equilibrium bounded bargaining schemes. Since the
stable set deÞned w.r.t. A is contained in AR, it follows that this set also meets
the internal and external stabilities w.r.t. AR.Moreover, since equilibrium σp is
regular, we have (σp, p) ∈ AR for all p. By this, the algorithm used in the proof
of Theorem 3 can be used here, too. Combining these, we get the following
important corollary.
Corollary 4 The unique stable set deÞned on A is the unique stable set deÞned
on AR.
A Note on Mixed Strategies Let us now allow players use mixed strate-
gies in game (g, p). By deÞnition, equilibrium bounded bargaining schemes may
use randomized strategies only if they randomize on Þnitely many periods. Thus
if one takes as the starting point set AR, then inÞnite randomization is auto-
matically ruled out. This implies that Lemma 1 and, a fortiori, Theorems 2
and 3 are in force even if Þnite mixing is allowed.
Feinberg and Skrzypacz (2002) build up equilibria in the binary valuations
case that generate the seller proÞt above θ0 even if it is not common knowledge
that sellers valuation is θ1. Their equilibrium uses inÞnitely mixed strategies.
By Theorem 2, such equilibria cannot be generated in our setting, where only
Þnite mixing is permitted. Thus, our theory is sensitive to inÞnite mixing.
InÞnite mixing is impossible to combine with players becoming to agree on
an implemented outcome in Þnite time. Because of this, equilibria using inÞnite
mixing cannot be replicated by equilibrium bounded bargaining schemes. One
either has to allow the possibility that the outcome is not implemented within
a bound, or one has to assume that inÞnite mixing does not take place. Which
is more reasonable?
To Þx the ideas, let us assume that a reasonable theory does not allow
boundless bargaining. This restriction not only removes inÞnitely mixed strate-
gies, but also questions the validity of game form g. But the aim of Theorems
6 and Corollary 4 is to justify the use of g as a shorthand description of robust
equilibrium bounded bargaining schemes rather than expression of a reasonable
bargaining situation per se. Since any equilibrium bounded bargaining scheme
implements all outcomes in Þnite time, the restriction above is avoided by the
equilibria of game form g. To conclude, the restriction to not allow bargaining
to go on forever permits game form g but does not permit inÞnite mixing.
6 Conclusions
The key contribution of this paper is methodological. We have modeled commitment-
free bargaining reduces to cheap talk where oﬀers and acceptances convey in-
formation only in equilibrium, and trade may be implemented only when no
further information is communicated. Thus, even without external commitment
devices one can design a bargaining game in such a way that (i) the equilibrium
play of the game always implemented trade within certain time bound, (ii) the
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equilibrium play is unaﬀected by any extension of the bound. A pair of game
and its equilibrium satisfying these properties is called an equilibrium bounded
bargaining scheme that is robust against bound extensions.
In more concrete terms, one may think the process as one where the players
Þrst agree on a bounded communication protocol, i.e. who says what and when,
and on the implementation procedure as a function of the exchanged messages.
Since players lack any commitment power, the communication protocol has to
be designed in such a way that no-one wants to continue communication once
the bound is reached. Since players are rational, the planned communication
must consitute an equilibrium within the protocol. After agreeing on the rules
and the equilibrium, they play the game. Thus players agree to implement an
outcome in equilibrium rather than are bounded to by external forces.
We show that robust equilibrium bounded bargaining schemes can be char-
acterized in a parsimonious way by bargaining game g that never ends but
associates players with payoﬀs (a,m) if players agree on (a,m) starting from
some stage. Thus focusing on equilibria of g is without loss of generality.
Like many inÞnite horizon games, g hosts many equilibria. We argue that
the selection criterion that allows the seller to possess a leading role in equi-
librium selection can be compactly represented by a vNM stable set once one
imposes a dynamic consistency criterion on the selection rule. With Þnite type
space, a stable set is unique, and stable equilibria in the stable set have in the
binary valuations case a very simple and intuitive characterization: stable equi-
librium always sells the good to buyer with the least possible valuation in the
belief close set of buyers reservation valuations. In the many valuations case
the same is true when beliefs satisfy certain (weak) monotonicity condition.
Thus, when sellers beliefs are common knowledge, the result coincides with
the standard result in the Gap case. However, it questions the validity of an
argument that with private information about buyers valuation the seller can
counterbalance the situation in favor of her.
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